By John Greco
After we verify (or deny) that somebody is familiar with anything, we're creating a worth judgment of varieties - we're claiming that there's anything greater (or inferior) approximately that person's opinion, or their facts, or maybe approximately them. A crucial job of the speculation of data is to enquire this type of review at factor. this can be the 1st ebook to make 'epistemic normativity,' or the normative size of data and information ascriptions, its vital concentration. John Greco argues that wisdom is a type of success, in place of mere fortunate luck. This locates wisdom inside a broader, regular normative area. via reflecting on our considering and practices during this area, it really is argued, we achieve perception into what wisdom is and what sort of price it has for us.
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Additional info for Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity
According to this model, a deliberating agent will choose an action with maximum expected utility. The expected utility of an envisioned act is a certain kind of weighted sum: the sum of respective numerical values the agent assigns to the various envisioned potential outcomes of that act, with each value weighted by the agent’s subjective probability of the given outcome’s resulting from that act. Now, one way such a decision-making system might work would be computational. For instance, it might actually calculate this weighted sum, for each envisioned act, then compare the totals for the acts and calculate which act or acts have maximal expected utility, and then pick an act with maximal expected utility.
And these would seem to include various syntactic, semantic, and qualitative properties that are at least often at the level of conscious awareness. The current suggestion is full of problems and controversy. Perhaps most importantly, it is not clear what properties of beliefs and experience count as potentially conscious in the relevant sense. But at this point in the argument we should be as generous as possible. Remember, we are trying to characterize strong deontological theories so that they at least get off the ground, and this requires that we have a characterization of cognitive rules that makes being governed by such rules possible.
The rest of the chapter is details. In Section 2 I develop the argument against weak deontological theories of knowledgerelevant normativity, or theories that endorse D(W). In Section 3 I develop the argument against strong deontological theories of knowledge-relevant normativity, or theories that endorse D(S). In Section 4 I briefly argue that a virtue-theoretic account can avoid the objections raised against both kinds of deontological theory. Again, a virtue-theoretic account becomes especially attractive in the light of the considerations here raised against deontological theories.
Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity by John Greco